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INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS
a. Scope
This memorandum examines the requirements of pleading Joint Criminal Enterprise
(hereinafter JCE) in indictments at the ad hoc and hybrid tribunals and co-perpetration at the
International Criminal Court (hereinafter ICC). In particular this memorandum will examine
the development of JCE and co-perpetration as a doctrines of individual criminal responsibility
and the rules that developed along with them concerning the proper pleading of both in
indictments.
It must be noted at the beginning that because the indictment must set out the material
facts of the prosecution’s case with enough detail to give the defendant notice of the crimes he is
being charged with1, the prosecution must plead both the crimes committed and the mode of
liability. First the prosecution must plead enough material facts to establish the objective (actus
reus) and subjective (mens rea) elements of the crime committed. Second the prosecution must
also plead sufficient facts to establish the accused’s criminal liability through the mode of
criminal responsibility by showing that the accused fulfilled the objective (actus reus) and
subjective (mens rea) elements of the mode of criminal responsibility.
The first section of this memorandum will examine the origins of JCE and its original
scope of liability. The first section will continue by considering the development of the scope



“What are the requirements of pleading JCE in an indictment? What are the requirements of
pleading co-perpetratorship in an indictment under the ICC statute?”.
1

Prosecutor v. Ntakirutimana & Ntakirutimana, Case Nos. ICTR-96-10-A and ICTR 96-17-A,
Appeals Judgment, ¶470 (Dec. 13, 2004) [Reproduced at tab 16]; Regulation 52 of the
Regulations of the Court [Reproduced at tab 30].
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and pleading rules of JCE at the ad hoc international criminal tribunals. It will then examine the
common criticisms of the doctrine of JCE and the challenges that have arisen in cases concerning
the scope of its applicability and rules regarding its proper pleading. The first section of the
memorandum will finish with a survey of the most recent cases regarding the scope and pleading
of JCE.
The second section of this memorandum will examine the adoption of co-perpetratorship
as a mode of individual criminal responsibility at the ICC. Again because co-perpetration is a
mode of criminal responsibility the prosecution must substantively plead both the crimes
committed and the mode of liability. Thus the second section will again begin with the
examination of the objective (actus reus) and subjective (mens rea) and elements of coperpetration. The second section will then continue to examine the pleading and evidentiary
standards set forth in the Rome Statute. It will then examine the three pre-trial judgments
rendered thus far concerning co-perpetration. The second section will finish with an examination
of what the requirements are pleading of co-perpetratorship in light of the pre-trial judgments.
This memorandum will finish with a comparison of the pleading requirements for JCE
and co-perpetratorship.

b. Summary of Conclusions
i. The indictment must set out the material facts of the prosecution’s case
with enough detail to give the defendant notice of the crimes he is being
charged with.
Case law from the international tribunals recognizes that the rights of the accused to a fair
trial require that the indictment plead sufficient material facts to give the accused notice of the
crimes he is being charged with.

9

ii. JCE and Co-perpetration are modes of criminality and not crimes
themselves; the prosecution must make a twofold pleading concerning the
actual crimes perpetrated and the proper mode of criminal responsibility.
Because the indictment must set out the material facts of the prosecution’s case with
enough detail to give the defendant notice of the crimes he is being charged with, the prosecution
must plead both the crimes committed and the mode of liability. Furthermore because the
standards for indictments at the international tribunals as well the ICC requires that the accused
be put on notice of the crimes he is being charges with, the prosecution must not only provide
sufficient evidence to support the crimes committed but also sufficient evidence to impute the
proper mode of liability.
iii. The prosecution must define what the common design, purpose, or plan
of the JCE is and must identify which form of liability it seeks for each
criminal count charged.
Lack of specificity in an indictment concerning the form of criminal liability the accused
is charged with gives rise to ambiguity that should be avoided. Thus it held that the prosecution
must identify which form; basic, systemic, or extended form JCE at the international tribunals, or
direct perpetration, co-perpetration, or indirect perpetration at the ICC.
iv. The prosecution must identify as precisely as possible the principal
perpetrators of the crime and the co-perpetrators within the JCE.
In order to provide the accused with proper notice the prosecution must identify in the
indictment who the principal perpetrators of the crime are and who the other members of the JCE
or co-perpetration are. While the prosecutor must identify the plurality of persons belonging to
the JCE, it is not necessary to identify all members by name and in some circumstances it is
sufficient to refer to categories or groups of persons.
v. The prosecution should endeavor to plead both the elements of the crime
charged and the elements of the mode of liability with the greatest degree
of specificity possible in order to avoid challenges of improper notice.
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It is the opinion of this author that the prosecution should for all intents and purposes
plead both the elements of the crime charged and the elements of the mode of liability with the
greatest degree of specificity possible in order to avoid challenges of improper notice. While the
prosecution need not outline its entire case in the indictment it should consider whether there will
be any confusion concerning the mode of liability it is charging with regards to the crimes
actually perpetrated. It is no longer sufficient to ask the courts to impute JCE liability
themselves; the defendant should be put on notice of what crimes he is accused of committing
and by what means.
41. JOINT CRIMINAL ENTERPRISE2
a. The Origins of Joint Criminal Enterprise – Tadic
The origins of the use of JCE liability at the ad hoc tribunals traces back to the Appeals
Judgment in Prosecutor v. Tadic. Dusko Tadic was a nationalist political leader for the Bosnian
Serbs who was brought before the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia
(hereinafter ICTY) to stand trial for crimes committed in the Omarska detention camp in Prijedor
municipality in the course of 1992, when he was president of the local board of the Serbian
Democratic Party, SDS, in Kozarac.3 The Prosecutor indicted Tadic on 34 counts of war crimes
and crimes against humanity encompassed in the ICTY statute and jurisdiction.4 While the Trial

2

This section on JCE, concerning the origins of JCE through the Trial Judgment in Prosecutor v.
Brima, owes its basis to Niki Dasarathy’s memorandum for the Special Court for Sierra Leone
Using Criminal Means to Arrive at a Legitimate Purpose: JCE Liability and Notice in Light of
the Prosecutor v. Brima, Kamara and Kanu Judgment, [Reproduced at tab 34].
3

Summary of Appeals Chamber Judgment, the Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic,
http://www.un.org/icty/pressreal/tad-sumj990715e.htm, [Reproduced at tab 3].
4

Id.
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Chamber found Tadic guilty of several counts of war crimes, it acquitted him of multiple charges
of murder on the basis that there was no evidentiary support that Tadic had taken any part in the
killings. The Trial Chamber held that it was satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that Tadic was a
member of the group of armed men that entered the village of Jaskici that searched for men and
beat them, and that after the group left five dead men were found dead in the village. However,
it held that it could not be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that Tadic has any part in the killing
of the five men.5
Both the Prosecutor and Tadic appealed the Trial Chamber’s decision and presented the
Appeals Chamber with the difficult question of whether there was any way to hold Tadic
criminally responsible for the murders that he had jointly planned the commission of. In
examining the statute providing the Court’s jurisdiction, particularly Article 7(1), the Chamber
deduced the doctrine of JCE.6 Article 7(1) of the ICTY Statute states that “a person who
planned, instigated, ordered, committed, or otherwise aided and abetted in the planning,
perpetration or execution of a crime referred to in article 2 to 5 of the present Statute, shall be
individually responsible for the crime”.7 The Appeals Chamber considered that failing to hold
co-perpetrators responsible for war crimes would therefore be contrary to the purpose of the

5

Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-T, Trial Judgment, ¶373 (May 7, 1997) [Reproduced at
tab 1].
6

Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Appeals Judgment, ¶189 (July 15, 1999),
[Reproduced at tab 2].
7

Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, ¶7(1), May 25, 1993,
32 I.L.M. 1192, available at http://www.icty.org/sid/135 (hereinafter ICTY Statute)
[Reproduced at tab 24].
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court, especially when the court had express jurisdiction over them.8 Thus despite the fact that
the indictment against Tadic did not charge him with participation in a JCE, the Appeals
Chamber nevertheless found that his participation in the JCE could be inferred from the ICTY
Statue and the nature of the crimes alleged in the indictment. The Appeals Chamber held that
“the notion of common design as a form of accomplice liability its firmly established in
customary international law and...is upheld, albeit implicitly in the Statute of the International
Tribunal.”9
b. Forms of Joint Criminal Enterprise
While the Appeals Chamber in Tadic concluded that “international criminal
responsibility embraces actions perpetrated by a collectivity of persons in furtherance of a
common criminal design”10, the ICTY Statute did not specify the objective (actus reus) and
subjective (mens rea) elements of JCE. Thus the Appeals Chamber turned to customary
international law to determine what these elements were, relying heavily on the jurisprudence of
post-World War II cases.11 Thus the Appeals Chamber identified three forms of JCE: basic
form, systemic form, and extended form.
i. Basic Form (First Category JCE)
8

Jens David Ohlin, Three Conceptual Problems with the Doctrine of Joint Criminal Enterprise,
5 J. INT’L CRIM. J. 69 (2007), [Reproduced at tab 31].
9

Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Appeals Judgment, ¶220 (July 15, 1999),
[Reproduced at tab 2].
10

Id. at ¶193.

Ciara Damgaard, The Joint Criminal Enterprise Doctrine: A “Monster Theory of Liability” or
a Legitimate and Satisfactory Tool in the Prosecution of the Perpetrators of Core International
Crimes?, in Individual Criminal Responsibility for Core International Crimes, 127-261, 2008.
[Reproduced at tab 33].
11

13

The first category identified by the Appeals Chamber in Tadic involves cases where there
is an agreement between multiple persons to intentionally commit a crime. The agreement need
not be explicit but instead may be inferred by the circumstances surrounding the crime. All that
is required to infer an agreement is that all codefendants acted pursuant to a common design and
possessed the same criminal intention.12 The accused must also voluntarily participate in the act
and intend the result. This category of JCE also applies to cases where co-perpetrators share the
same intent to commit the crime and one of the co-perpetrators physically carries out the
objective elements of the crime.13
ii. Systematic Form (Second Category JCE)
The second category identified by the Appeals Chamber in Tadic is often referred to as
“concentration camp” cases in relation to its systemic and structural nature.14 In this form of
JCE there is a systemic plan to commit a criminal act (such as concentration camp crimes) and
the presence of an individual within such a structure can be used to infer their assent and consent
to join in the criminal enterprise. In this form of JCE the accused must always be in a position of
authority within the system.15
iii. Extended Form (Third Category JCE)
The final category of JCE identified by the Appeals Chamber in Tadic involves cases
where the accused is a member of a common plan and another member of the JCE, while acting
12

Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Appeals Judgment, ¶193 (July 15, 1999),
[Reproduced at tab 2].
13

Id. at ¶192-206.

14

Id. at ¶202.

15

Id. at ¶193.
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outside of the scope of the plan, commits a criminal act. In such cases the accused is held
principally liable if the co-perpetrators act was “a natural and foreseeable consequence of the
effecting of that common purpose”.16 The reasoning behind this is to hold those who effectuated
the common plan liable for the foreseeable consequences of their actions.
c. Elements of Joint Criminal Enterprise
i. Objective Elements (Actus Reus)
After establishing the three forms of JCE the Appeals Chamber in Tadic further held that
all three forms require the following three actus reus elements. First there must be a plurality of
persons involved in the JCE, although they need not necessarily be organized in a military,
political, or administrative structure.17 While there must be some structure in order for JCE to
exist, such a structure can come into existence upon the mere agreement between multiple
persons to a common plan or design. Second there must exist “a common plan, design or
purpose which amounts to or involves the commission of a crime provided for in the Statute”.18
A common plan need not exist prior to the commission of the crime, rather when a group of
persons act in unison to jointly commit a crime an inference can be made as to the existence of a

16

Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Appeals Judgment, ¶204 (July 15, 1999),
[Reproduced at tab 2].
17

Id. at ¶227; Prosecutor v. Stakic, Case No. IT-97-24-A, Appeals Judgment, ¶64 (Mar. 22,
2006). [Reproduced at tab 4].
18

Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Appeals Judgment, ¶226(July 15, 1999). The
language “common plan, design, or purpose” is meant to encompass all situations in which a
JCE might arise. This memorandum uses the words “plan, design, and purposefully”
interchangeably in order to appropriately address differing situations concerning JCE’s and the
use of any one word is to be understood as encompassing all three.

15

common plan.19 Finally the accused must in joining the JCE must commit, assist, or contribute
to a punishable crime under the Statute.20 The Appeals Chamber further held that there need not
be any prior planning to form a JCE, that the formation of a JCE may occur extemporaneously,
and that the accused must always have the intent to commit the crime identified under the
Statute.21
ii. Subjective Elements (Mens Rea)
In regards to the subjective elements of JCE, however, the requisite mens rea differs
depending upon the form of JCE alleged against the accused.22 The basic and systemic form of
JCE require an intention to participate in and further the criminal activity or purpose of the
group, and requires that all participants in the JCE posses the same criminal intent.23 For
extended form JCE the accused must only intend to participate in and further the criminal plan.
However because extended form JCE applies to crimes that fall outside the criminal purpose of
the JCE, it must be foreseeable to the accused that another member of the group might perpetrate
the crimes that were actually committed, and the accused must willingly accept the risk of the
commission of such crimes.24

19

Id.

20

Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Appeals Judgment, ¶226(July 15, 1999).
[Reproduced at tab 2].
21

Id. at ¶227.

22

Prosecutor v. Babic, Case No. IT-03072-A, Appeals Judgment, ¶38 (July 18, 2005).
[Reproduced at tab 5].
23

Elise van Sliedregt, Joint Criminal Enterprise as a Pathway to Convicting Individuals for
Genocide, 5 J. INT’L CRIM. J. 184 (2007) [Reproduced at tab 32].
24

Id.
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d. Continued Development/Narrowing of JCE
In Tadic the prosecution did not specifically allege Joint Criminal Enterprise; rather the
Appeals Chamber found that JCE could be inferred from a combination of the charges alleged
and Article 7(1) of the Statute.25 Following the Tadic decision the ad hoc international tribunals
were left to craft pleading rules guided only by their Statutes and Rules of Procedure. At the
ICTY the applicable article of the Statute is Article 18(4) and the applicable rule is Rule 47(C) of
the Rules of Procedure. Similarly at the ICTR the applicable article of the Statute is Article
17(4) and the applicable rule is Rule 47(C) of the Rules of Procedure 26. Article 18(4) of the
Statute provides that the indictment must set out “a concise statement of the facts and the crime
or crimes with which the accused is charged”.27 Similarly Rule 47(C) of the Rules provides that
the indictment shall set out the name and particulars of the suspect as well as “a concise
statements of the facts of the case”.28 While both requirements are to be read in light of the
Article 21(4)29 provisions concerning the rights of the accused to a fair trial, the international
tribunals nevertheless began allowing broad and general pleading of JCE in indictments under

25

Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Appeals Judgment, ¶189-90 (July 15, 1999),
[Reproduced at tab 2].
26

The provisions of the ICTR Statute were copied directly from the ICTY statute. Both tribunals
share the same Rules of Procedure. The difference in numbering here has arisen due to the
revisions that have been made to the ICTY statute. While this memorandum will only address
the ICTY statute directly, any such discussion should also be understood as addressing the
relevant provisions in the ICTR statute.
27

Article 18(4) of the ICTY and 17(4) of the ICTR Statutes, [Reproduced at tabs 24 and 26].

28

Rule 47(C) of the Rules of Procedure for the ICTY and ICTR, [Reproduced at tabs 25 and 27].

29

Article 20(4) at the ICTR, [Reproduced at tab 26].
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blanket indictments alleging that the accused is liable under all modes of liability outlined in
Article 7(1) of the ICTY Statute.30
However due to continual challenges by defense teams alleging that the vagueness in
pleadings infringed upon the accused’s Article 21(4) rights, the tribunals were eventually forced
to address the issue of specificity in pleading JCE. This section of the memorandum will
examine the rules of pleading that developed in the international tribunals in the wake of Tadic.
iii. The prosecution must identify which form; basic, systemic, or extended,
of liability it seeks for each criminal count charged
One of the early issues that the tribunals had to deal with was whether the prosecution
could generally plead the accused’s participation in a JCE or if the it had to identify a specific
form of JCE liability for each charge in the indictment. In Prosecutor v. Krnojelac the Appeals
Chamber noted that a lack of specificity in an indictment concerning the form of criminal
liability the accused is charged with gives rise to ambiguity that should be avoided. Thus it held
that the prosecution must identify which form; basic, systemic, or extended, of liability is
applicable to each criminal count charged.31 The Appeals Chamber in Prosecutor v. Kvocka
similarly held that in order for the accused to be put on proper notice the indictment should
include the particular form of JCE alleged.32

Ciara Damgaard, The Joint Criminal Enterprise Doctrine: A “Monster Theory of Liability” or
a Legitimate and Satisfactory Tool in the Prosecution of the Perpetrators of Core International
Crimes?, in Individual Criminal Responsibility for Core International Crimes, 127-261, 2008,
[Reproduced at tab 33].
30

31

Prosecutor v. Krnojelac, Case No. IT-97-25-A, Appeals Judgment, ¶138 (Sept. 17, 2003).
[Reproduced at tab 6].
32

Prosecutor v. Kvocka, Case No. IT-98-30/1-A, Appeals Judgment, ¶28 (Feb. 28, 2005).
[Reproduced at tab 7].
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iv. The prosecution is allowed to plead multiple forms of JCE for the same
crimes
In light of the fact that the it held that the prosecution must identify the form of the
accused’s JCE liability in relation to each charge, the Appeals Chamber in Krnojelac had to
further deal with was whether the prosecution could plead multiple forms for the same criminal
charge. The Chamber held that while the prosecution is allowed allege more than one form of
JCE so long as it is done a clear manner that gives proper notice to the accused.33
v. The Prosecution must define the common design, purpose, or plan
The Appeals Chamber in Kronjelac further held that regardless of the form of JCE
alleged, the prosecution is required to strictly define the common plan and identify as precisely
as possible the principal perpetrators of the crimes committed.34 The Chamber held that the
underlying reason for this is because the prosecution must put the accused on proper notice of the
crimes he is charged with and “the accused must know whether the system he is charged with
having contributed to involves all the acts being prosecuted or only some of them”.35 While the
common plan need not have been previously arranged or formulated and may materialize
extemporaneously, inferred from the fact that a plurality of person acted in unison to effectuate
the JCE36, the purpose of the JCE nevertheless must be identified.
vi. The Prosecution must specify whether the accused’s “commission” is the
physical commission of the crime or the participation in a JCE, or both.
33

Prosecutor v. Krnojelac, Case No. IT-97-25-A, Appeals Judgment, ¶115 (Sept. 17, 2003).
[reproduced at tab 6]
34

Id.

35

Id. at ¶117
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Prosecutor v. Furundzija, Case No. IT-95-17/1, Trial Judgment, ¶39-41 (Dec. 10, 1998)
[Reproduced at tab 8].
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The Appeals Chamber in Krnojelac further held that in the indictment the prosecution
must specify what it means by the when it charges the accused with the “commission” one of the
crimes under the statute within the meaning of Article 7(1). The Chamber thus held that the
prosecution must identify whether the accused’s “commission” of a crime under the Statute was
the physical commission of the crime or the accused’s participation in a JCE, or both.37
vii. The indictment must set out the material facts of the prosecution’s case
with enough detail to give the accused proper notice and allow him a
chance to prepare his defense.
In Prosecutor v. Ntakirutimana at the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR)
the Appeals Chamber held that the standard of specificity required in an indictment is
“dependant upon whether it sets out the material facts of the Prosecution case with enough detail
to inform a defendant clearly of the charges against him or her so that he or she may prepare his
or her defence [sic].”38 It thus held that in the case before it the indictment had been improperly
plead because it did not mention JCE and because “the mere reference by the Prosecution to the
joint criminal enterprise illustrating the ‘dolus eventualis’ doctrine in its Pre-Trial and Closing
Briefs cannot be understood as an unambiguous pleading of participation in the first form of joint
criminal enterprise which is the form the Prosecution advances in this appeal.”39
viii. The prosecution must identify as precisely as possible the principal
perpetrators of the crime and the co-perpetrators within the JCE.

37

Prosecutor v. Krnojelac, Case No. IT-97-25-A, Appeals Judgment, ¶38 (Sept. 17, 2003).
[Reproduced at tab 6].
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Prosecutor v. Ntakirutimana & Ntakirutimana, Case Nos. ICTR-96-10-A and ICTR 96-17-A,
Appeals Judgment, ¶470 (Dec. 13, 2004), [Reproduced at tab 17].
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Id. at ¶479.
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In Krnojelac the Appeals Chamber held that the prosecution must identify as precisely as
possible the principal perpetrators of the crimes committed.40 This requirement was expanded
upon in Prosecutor v. Kvocka where Appeals Chamber held that “if the Prosecution relies on a
theory of joint criminal enterprise, then the prosecutor must plead the purpose of the enterprise,
the identity of the participants, and the nature of the accused’s participation in the enterprise.”41
Thus the chamber held that not only must the prosection identify the physical perpetrators of the
crime but also the co-perpetrators of the JCE. As such, in Prosecutor v. Bala the Trial Chamber
held that JCE was inappropriately plead where the prosecution did not identify the identities of
the participants.42 In Bala, Bala was accused of participating in a JCE involving the detention of
civilians in a prison camp. The Chamber held that while in this situation it may have been
possible to infer from the circumstances and the structure of the prison camp his participation in
a JCE, the failure to identify other participants caused the allegations of JCE to fail.43
ix. The Prosecution must show that the accused shares the mens rea of the
other members of the JCE in joining the JCE and perform acts that are
directed at furthering the common design.

40

Prosecutor v. Krnojelac, Case No. IT-97-25-A, Appeals Judgment, ¶116 (Sept. 17, 2003)
[Reproduced at tab 6].
41

Prosecutor v. Kvocka, Case No. IT-98-30/1-A, Appeals Judgment, ¶28 (Feb. 28, 2005),
[Reproduced at tab 7]. The Appeals Chamber in Kvocka held that these requirements must
especially be plead for extended for m JCE because the natural and foreseeable consequences of
an individuals participation are subjective and may not be what is natural and foreseeable to
another person. Thus particularly for extended form JCE these factors need to be identified in
order for the accused to know whether he is being charged with all of the crimes encompassed by
JCE or only some of them.
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Prosecutor v. Linaj, Bala, Musliu,, Case No. IT-03-66-T, Trial Judgment, ¶666 (Nov. 30 2005)
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A further restriction on pleading JCE arose in Prosecutor v. Babic where the Appeals
Chamber stated that to be held as a co-perpetrator in a JCE the accused must share the mens rea
of his co-perpetrators in joining the JCE and perform acts that are directed at furthering the
common design.44 However where there is a lack of direct evidence concerning intent, the
circumstances surrounding the JCE can be used to infer intent.45
x. If the objective of the JCE changes such that it is different in nature from
the original plan then a new JCE has been established.
An additional restriction on pleading JCE concerns when the objective of the JCE
changes. In Prosecutor v. Blagojevic the Trial Chamber held that when the objective of the JCE
changes such that it is different in nature from the original design, purpose, or plan, then a new
JCE has been established. The Trial Chamber further held that when a new JCE has been
established and substantive and procedural requirements of JCE must be met. Thus where the
prosecution has identified a change in the JCE it must plead the indictment the nature of the new
JCE as well as identify the other participants in the JCE.46
e. Criticisms of JCE
Due to its broad nature and its widespread use at the ad hoc international tribunals, JCE
as a doctrine has come under much scrutiny and criticism from both scholars and practitioners of
international criminal law. One of the most common criticisms of JCE is that it overextends the
scope of individual criminal responsibility. More specifically it has been alleged by some
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Prosecutor v. Babic, Case No. IT-03-72-A, Appeals Judgment, ¶38 (July 18, 2005),
[Reproduced at tab 5].
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Prosecutor v. Kvocka, Case No. IT-98-30/1-A, Appeals Judgment, ¶243 (Feb. 28, 2005),
[Reproduced at tab 7].
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Prosecutor v. Blagojevic, Jokic, Case No. It-02-60-T, Trial Judgment, ¶700 (Jan. 17, 2005),
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experts that JCE establishes an objective test for the subjective requirements concerning mens
rea.47 Thus because intent has been allowed to be “inferred” from the circumstances, JCE has
been criticized because it evaluates criminal responsibility purely on a persons actions, the
joining of the JCE, and not their state of mind in doing so.
Furthermore, extended form JCE has come under specifically harsh criticism for its
“foreseeability” standard, which has been interpreted as applying a recklessness or negligence
standard of guilt to crimes that require elevated levels of intent such as knowledge and
purposefulness.48 This is especially true in the case where JCE has been alleged in conjunction
with the crime of genocide because genocide is a specific intent crime, which itself requires
multiple elements of elevated intent.49 A further criticism of the scope of JCE liability is that it
is overly broad and allows criminal liability to be imputed between structurally remote members
of the JCE who may not even know each other or each other’s actions.50 Additionally, JCE has
also been criticized as a form of “organizational liability” where individuals are held liable for
their associate’s actions even where there is no causal link between the accused’s actions and
intent and the crime that was committed.51

Ciara Damgaard, The Joint Criminal Enterprise Doctrine: A “Monster Theory of Liability” or
a Legitimate and Satisfactory Tool in the Prosecution of the Perpetrators of Core International
Crimes?, in Individual Criminal Responsibility for Core International Crimes, 216, 2008,
[Reproduced at tab 33].
47
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Id. at 214-218.
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Elise van Sliedregt, Joint Criminal Enterprise as a Pathway to Convicting Individuals for
Genocide, Journal of International Criminal Justice 5 (2007) 188, 190-191, [Reproduced at tab
32].
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Id.
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Antonio Cassesse, The Proper Limits of Individual Responsibility Under the Doctrine of Joint
Criminal Enterprise, 5 J. Int’l Crim. Just. 109, 114 (1997), [Reproduced at tab 34].
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f. Reactionary Judgments to the criticisms of JCE
xi. Prosecutor v. Brdanin
In 2004 the Prosecutor v. Brdanin Trial Judgment attempted to realign the international
community’s understanding of the scope of JCE. Not only did the Judgment introduced the
requirement that an indictment must specifically identify the groups involved in the JCE52, later
expanded upon in Kvocka, but it also proposed to establish an additional elements to establish the
existence of a JCE.
The Trial Chamber held that for JCE liability to appropriately be applied to the accused
the common plan must exist directly between the accused and the physical perpetrators of the
crime.53 Understanding the criticisms of the scope of JCE, the Chamber stated that it is not
sufficient to prove merely an agreement to commit the crime between the accused and the
superior of the actual perpetrator. Instead, the Chamber held that accused must have entered into
and agreement with the physical perpetrator to commit the crime, or the crime perpetrated must
be the natural and foreseeable consequence of the crime agreed upon between the accused and
the physical perpetrators.54 In Brdanin the Trial Chamber rejected the inference of the necessary
agreement because of the “physical and structural remoteness between the Accused and the
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Proseuctior v. Brdanin & Talic, Case No. IT-99-36, Decision on Objections by Momir Talic to
the Form of the Amended Indictment, ¶21 (Feb. 20 2001), [Reproduced at tab 11].
Alan O’Rourke, Joint Criminal Enterprise and Brdanin: Misguided Overcorrection, 47 Harv.
Int’l L.J. 307 (Winter 2006) at 318, [Reproduced at tab 35].
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Proseuctior v. Brdjanin, Case No. IT-99-36-T, Trial Judgment, ¶347 (Sept. 1 2004),
[Reproduced at tab 12].
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Relevant Physical perpetrators and the fact that the Relevant Physical Perpetrators in most cases
have not even been personally identified.”55
xii. Brdanin Appeals Judgment
After the Trial Judgment in Brdanin the prosecution appealed to the Appeals Chamber
for clarification as to the general applicability of JCE as a mode of criminal liability.56 The
prosecution’s first ground of appeal posed the question of whether the Trial Chamber had
correctly held that the principal perpetrators of the crime must themselves be members of the
JCE.57 The Appeals Chamber held that the Trial Chamber had erred and found that a member of
a JCE could be held responsible for crimes committed by non-members of the enterprise,
provided that the crime could be imputed to one member of the JCE and that that member, when
using the non-member principal perpetrator, was acting in accordance with the common plan.58
The Appeals Chamber held that for basic form JCE the question is not whether a the principal
perpetrator of the crime is a member of the JCE, but rather whether the crime committed was
part of the common purpose of the JCE. It additionally held that in cases where the principal
perpetrator of the crime is not a member of the JCE, the determination of whether the crimes
forms a part of the criminal purpose may be inferred from the circumstances of the crime and the
JCE.59
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Proseuctior v. Brdjanin, Case No. IT-99-36-A, Appeals Judgment, ¶354(April 3, 2007).
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Proseuctior v. Brdjanin, Case No. IT-99-36-A, Appeals Judgment, ¶410 (April 3, 2007).
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The prosecution’s second ground of appeal posed the question of whether the Trial
Chamber had erred in holding that the prosecution must prove that the accused had a specific
agreement with the principal perpetrator to commit a particular crime.60 The Appeals Chamber
again held that the Trial Chamber had erred and held that a showing of a specific agreement
between the accused and the principal perpetrator is unnecessary in view of the common plan
necessarily shared by all JCE members. Nonetheless, the Appeals Chamber held that the
Prosecution must still prove other elements, including the fact that the accused shared the
common criminal purpose and that the crime in question forms part of that common criminal
purpose.61
The prosecution’s final ground of appeal posed the question of whether the Trial
Chamber had appropriately held that JCE applies only to “small-scale” cases.62 In this regards
the Appeals Chamber again held that the Trial Chamber erred in finding that the doctrine of JCE
applies only to relatively small- scale cases. The Appeals Chamber held that prior cases provided
clear authority for the use of JCE liability on scales much larger than the one municipality it was
alleged to have existed in with relation to Brdanin.63 In the wake of Brdanin many commentators
noted that had the Trial Judgment been allowed to stand, the application of JCE as a mode of
criminal liability would have been scaled back immensely.64 While the Trial Judgment
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Id. at ¶377
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Id. at ¶419
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Id. at ¶386
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Id. at ¶422-245
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Antonio Cassesse, The Proper Limits of Individual Responsibility Under the Doctrine of Joint
Criminal Enterprise, 5 J. Int’l Crim. Just. 109, 114 (1997) [Reproduced at tab 34]
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ultimately did not stand, the applicability of JCE and the rules regarding its proper pleading in
indictments has nevertheless continued to attract controversy.
xiii. Prosecutor v. Brima, Kamara, Kanu
In particular the case of Prosecutor v. Brima, Kamara, Kanu (hereinafter Brima), at the
Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL), presented another case where a Trial Chamber attempted
to scale back the scope of JCE and the rules of pleading concerning it. In Brima the Trial
Chamber held that the indictment was improperly plead because it did not provide adequate
notice to the defendants of the criminal purpose that they had allegedly agreed upon.65
In Brima the prosecution alleged that the defendants were involved in a JCE to “take any
actions necessary to gain and exercise political power and control over the territory of Sierra
Leone, in particular the diamond mining areas.”66 More specifically the prosecution alleged that
the defendants were liable under Basic (first) and Extended (third) category JCE where:

The joint criminal enterprise included gaining and exercising control over the population of Sierra
Leone in order to prevent or minimize resistance to their geographic control, and to use members
of the population to provide support to the members of the join criminal enterprise. The crimes
alleged in this Indictment, including unlawful killings, abductions, forced labour [sic], physical
and sexual violence, use of child soldiers, looting and burning of civilian structures, were either
actions within the joint criminal enterprise or were a reasonably foreseeable consequence of the
join criminal enterprise.67
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Prosecutor v. Brima, Kamara, Kanu, Case No. SCSL-04-16-T, Trial Judgment, ¶71 (June 20,
2007), [Reproduced at tab 18].
66
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However the Trial Chamber held that the Indictment was defectively pleaded and as such it
would not consider JCE as a mode of criminal responsibility.68 The Trial Chamber held that for
JCE liability to arise the common purpose in a JCE must be criminal. It reasoned that “any
actions necessary” was not a crime under the SCSL statute and thus JCE had been improperly
alleged.69
The Chamber further held that because the Indictment failed to specify a period of time
during which the JCE existed or was created, it had to assume that the JCE was criminal from its
inception.70 The Chamber thus reasoned that because the common purpose was not criminal at
the time the defendants agreed to it, no JCE existed.71 The Chamber recognized based upon the
evidence that the original non-criminal common purpose eventually changed into criminal
common purpose, but noted that the Prosecution failed to proffer material evidence as to the
creation of the new criminal common purpose. Thus the Chamber noted that in a situation where
a non-criminal common purpose has changed into a criminal common purpose, the new
purpose(s) must be pled in the indictment.72 In the end the Chamber found the defendants guilty
of the crimes alleged in relation to the JCE, but only because the defendants had directly carried
out the alleged crimes.
xiv. Brima Appeals Judgment
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Prosecutor v. Brima, Kamara, Kanu, Case No. SCSL-04-16-T, Trial Judgment, ¶85 (June 20,
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Following the Trial Judgment in Brima the prosecution appealed to the Appeals Chamber
on the grounds that the Trial Chamber had improperly dismissed the charges of JCE for
vagueness in the indictment.73 In considering the prosecution’s appeal the Appeals Chamber
began by examining the general requirements of specificity in indictments. The Appeals
Chamber thus held that the prosecution is obliged to plead material facts with a sufficient degree
of specificity, which are to be examined within the context of the particular case.74 The Chamber
further noted that the degree of specificity required varies according to the form participation
alleged.75
In relation to the prosecution’s appeal concerning the issue of adequate pleading of JCE,
the Appeals Chamber, citing ICTY precedent, concluded that the requirement that the common
plan of a joint criminal enterprise be inherently criminal means that the plan must either have as
its objective a crime within the Statute or contemplate crimes within the Statute as a means of
achieving its objective.76 Thus the Appeals Chamber held that the common purpose of the JCE
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22, 2008)
74

Id. at ¶37.

75

Id. at ¶38.

76
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indictments in Prosecutor v. Martic and Prosecutor v. Haradinaj, where the common designs of
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IT-97-24-A, Appeals Judgment (Mar. 22, 2006). In Stakic the indictment claimed that the
purpose of the JCE was the permanent forcible removal of Bosnian Muslims and Croats. This
purpose of forcible removal, while deplorable, is not a crime falling under the Statute of the
ICTY. However the Appeals Chamber nevertheless held Stakic liable for both Basic (first) and
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in the process.
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in Brima was not defectively pleaded.77 Although the objective of gaining and exercising
political power and control over the territory of Sierra Leone was not a crime under the SCSL
Statute, the actions contemplated, as a means to achieve that objective did constitute crimes
within the Statute.
The Appeals Chamber finished its consideration of the prosecution’s appeal by
examining whether the Trial Chamber erred in holding that the prosecution could not plead both
basic form JCE liability, and extended form JCE in the alternative, concerning the same crime on
the basis that the two forms of liability were mutually exclusive. In this regards the Appeals
Chamber held that the Trial Chamber did indeed err because the pleading of basic and extended
forms of JCE in the alternative “is now a well-established practice in the international criminal
tribunals.”78
g. Recent Cases
This section of the memorandum will now examine the current status of JCE as a mode
of criminal responsibility and two important recent decisions made at the ICTY with regards to
the proper pleading of JCE.
xv. Prosecutor v. Martic
In Prosecutor v. Martic, the Trial Chamber found Milan Martic guilty of participating in
a JCE, “the common purpose of which was the establishment of an ethnically Serb territory
through the displacement of the non-Serb population” through both basic and extended for
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JCE.79 At the Appeals Chamber, Martic challenged the Trial Chamber’s finding of a link
between the physical perpetrators of the criminal acts charged in the indictment and himself.
Specifically Martic alleged that the Trial Chamber erred in concluding that the crimes were
committed by forces under his control of the control of another member of the JCE because the
crimes were committed by unidentified individuals and “renegade” units. Martic further
submitted that the crimes occurred “spontaneously”.80
In addressing Martic’s challenges the Appeals Chamber applied the standards set forth by
the Appeals Chamber in Brdanin, which held that the decisive issue under basic form JCE is
whether the crime committed well within the common criminal purpose of the JCE, not whether
it was committed by a member of the JCE. The Appeals Chamber in Martic further adhered to
the Brdanin decision that for extended form JCE:
The accused may be found responsible provided that he participated in the common criminal
purpose with the requisite intent and that, in the circumstance of the case: (i) it was foreseeable
that such a crime might be perpetrated by one or more persons used by him (or by any other
member of the JCE) in order to carry out the actus reus of the crimes forming part of the common
purpose; and (ii) the accused willing took that risk. Thus the Chamber noted that members of a
JCE may be held liable for crimes committed by principal perpetrators who are not members of
the JCE provided that the crimes can be imputed to at least one member of the JCE and that the
member, when using the perpetrator, acted in accordance with the common plan. 81

The Appeals Chamber in Martic affirmed that the establishment of a link between the
crimes committed and the accused member of the JCE is a matter to be dealt with on a case-bycase basis. It then affirmed the Appeals Chamber’s methodology in Prosecutor v. Stakic in
assessing whether it is reasonable for a Trial Chamber to impute crimes to an accused, as a
member of a JCE, when other members of the JCE used the principal perpetrators of the crime to
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further the common purpose. Thus the Appeals Chamber in Martic considered that in respect to
crimes falling within the common criminal purpose, the determination of whether the crimes can
be imputed focuses on whether the accused intended to further this common purpose. In relation
to crimes falling outside the scope of the JCE, the Appeals Chamber considered the following in
determining whether the crimes could be imputed:
•

Whether crimes outside the common purpose occurred,

•

Whether such crimes were a natural and foreseeable consequence of the implementation
of the common purpose, and;

•

Whether the accused acted in furtherance of the common purpose despite an awareness of
the risk that such crimes were a possible consequence.82
Thus the Appeals Chamber reiterated that “in order to convict a member of a JCE for

crimes committed by non-members of the JCE, a Trial Chamber must be satisfied beyond a
reasonable doubt that the commission of the crimes by non-members of the JCE formed part of a
common criminal purpose (basic form JCE), or and organized criminal system (systemic form
JCE), or were a natural and foreseeable consequence of a common criminal purpose (extended
form JCE).83
The Appeals Chamber further held that liability under extended form JCE requires that
the crime was a foreseeable consequence for the accused and he willingly took that risk. Thus it
held that it is insufficient that an accused merely create the conditions making the crimes falling
outside the common purpose possible.84
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xvi. Prosecutor v. Krajisnik
In Prosecutor v. Krajisnik the Trial Chamber found Krajisnik guilty of crimes committed
while participating in a JCE whose objective was the permanent removal, by force or other
means, of Bosnian Muslims and Croats and other non-Serb’s through the commission of various
crimes.85 On appeal it was alleged that the Trial Chamber did not correctly identify the
participants of the JCE by referring to generic groups, thus casting doubt on the existence of a
common link between them and Krajisnik.86 However the Appeals Chamber held that while the
Trial Chamber must identify the plurality of persons belonging to the JCE, it is not necessary to
identify all members by name and that in some circumstances it is sufficient to refer to categories
or groups of persons.87 More importantly the Appeals Chamber considered whether the Trial
Chamber made sufficient findings as to whether the expanded crimes, crimes not originally
encompassed by the JCE, formed part of the JCE and thus could be imputed to Krajisnik.88
In Krajisnik the original crimes of the JCE were deportation and forcible transfer,
however, the Trial Chamber held that when the members of the JCE were informed of new
crimes and took no effective measures to prevent their recurrence, then those new crimes were
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incorporated into the original JCE.89 Thus the Trial Chamber held that the new crimes did not
form a new JCE, which would have required the prosecution to plead the existence of such new
JCE in the indictment.90
While the Appeals Chamber ultimately decided that the Trial Chamber improperly
imputed the new crimes into the JCE, it clarified that it is possible for the Trial Chamber to do so
and outlined what findings the Trial Chamber would have to make. Thus the Appeals Chamber
held that in order to impute responsibility under the basic form of JCE for the additional crimes
the leading members of the JCE must have been informed of the crimes and done nothing to
prevent the recurrence of the expanded crimes and continued the implementation of the original
criminal purpose. Furthermore the Appeals Chamber held that in order to impute crimes that
arose subsequent to the creation of the JCE the Trial Chamber must identify when the expanded
crimes became incorporated into the common purpose.91
It is important first to note that while the Appeals Chamber found that the Trial Chamber
failed to establish these elements, it did so in relation to the conclusion that the additional crimes
were incorporated into the common criminal plan in relation to basic form JCE liability only.
Thus the Appeals Chamber noted that had the Trail Chamber proceeded to impute the crimes
through extended form JCE the crimes would properly have been imputed to Krajisnik.92
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h. The Current Status of JCE and its Proper Pleading
This final section concerning JCE will first examine what the current status of JCE is as a
mode of individual criminal responsibility. It will then conclude with an examination of the
current rules regarding the proper pleading of JCE.
xvii. Prosecutor v. Boskoski, Tarculovski,
Prosecutor v. Boskoski, Tarculovski, best summarizes the current status of JCE as a form
of criminal responsibility. In Boskoski the Trial Chamber clearly outlined what is necessary for
JCE. The Trial Chamber identified and expanded upon the three actus reus of the participant is
common to all three forms of JCE.
•

First there must be a plurality of person, although they need not be organized in a
military, political or administrative structure.

•

Second there must exist a common plan, which amounts to or involves the commission of
a crime provided for in the Statute. This plan need not be previously formulated nor does
it require an understanding or agreement between the accused and the physical
perpetrator of the crime to commit the crime. The common plan may materialize
extemporaneously and may be inferred from the fact that a plurality of persons acted in
unison to effectuate a JCE.

•

Third, the accused must have participated in the common plan; either directly in the
commission of the crime, or by assisting or contributing to the execution of the common
plan. In the situation where the accused contributed to the execution of the common
plan, the contribution need not be necessary, or even substantial as a matter of law, to
achieve the common criminal purpose. The contribution should be significant however
and not every type of conduct amounts to a sufficiently significant contribution to impute

35

criminal liability. The presence of the accused in the JCE at the time of the commission
of the crime is not required.93
The Trial Chamber in Boskoski further identified the differing mens rea requirements of
JCE concerning each form of JCE alleged.
•

Basic form JCE requires that the accused intended to perpetrate a crime and the intent
was shared by all co-perpetrators.

•

Systemic from JCE requires that the accused had knowledge of the system of repression,
in the enforcement of which he participates, and the intent to further the common
concerted design to ill-treat the inmates of a concentration camp.

•

Extended form JCE, concerning cases were a participant commits a crime outside the
common plan, requires twofold mens rea. First the accused must have the intention to
take part in or contribute to the common plan. Second, in order to be held responsible for
crimes committed outside of the common criminal plan, the crimes must be the natural
and foreseeable consequence of the common plan and the accused must know that such a
crime might be perpetrated and willingly accept the risk of it occurring by joining or
continuing to participate in the JCE. The determination of whether the crimes committed
outside the purpose of the JCE were natural and foreseeable consequences is assessed in
relation to the knowledge of the accused; the Prosecution must prove the accused had
sufficient knowledge that the additional crimes were the natural and foreseeable
consequences of the effectuation of the common plan.94
Furthermore the Trial Chamber outlined that the physical perpetrators of the crime need

not be members of the JCE, so long as the crime committed formed part of the common purpose
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can be imputed to at least one member of the JCE, who used the perpetrator in with the purpose
of furthering the common plan. In such a situation the fact that the physical perpetrator knows of
the existence of the JCE may be taken into consideration in determining whether the crime forms
a part of the common plan.95
The accused may also be found responsible when the direct perpetrator commits a crime
beyond the common purpose of the JCE so long as the crime committed is the natural and
foreseeable consequence of effectuating the JCE. In this situation it must be foreseeable that a
crime might be perpetrated, by one or more persons used by the accused, in order to carry out the
actus reus of the crimes forming part of the JCE, and the accused willingly assumed the risk that
such crimes might occur.96
xviii. Current Status of Pleading JCE
The current pleading of JCE is still guided by the foundations set in the various statutes
of the international tribunals as well as the precedent developed by the international tribunals
themselves. Thus pursuant to Article 18(4) of the ICTY Statute, Article 17(4) of the ICTR
Statute, and similarly at the other international tribunals, the basis for indictments shall be a
concise statement of the facts and the crime(s) with which the accused is charged.97 Furthermore
the precedent set forth by the decisions of the international tribunals holds that:
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•

The Prosecution must strictly define what the common design, purpose, or plan of
the JCE is.98

•

The prosecution must identify which form; basic, systemic, or extended, of
liability it seeks for each criminal count charged.99

•

The prosecution is allowed to plead multiple forms, in the alternative, of JCE for
the same crimes.100

•

The prosecution must identify as precisely as possible the principal perpetrators of
the crime and the co-perpetrators within the JCE.101 While the prosecutor must
identify the plurality of persons belonging to the JCE, it is not necessary to
identify all members by name and in some circumstances it is sufficient to refer to
categories or groups of persons.102
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•

The Prosecution must specify whether the accused’s commission of a crime is the
physical commission of the crime or the participation in a JCE, or both.103

•

If the objective of the JCE changes such that it is different in nature from the
original plan then the prosecution must plead that a new JCE has been established
and identify the nature and participants of the JCE.104

•

The criminal purpose of a JCE may change if the leading members of the JCE
were informed of subsequent crimes not encompassed in the original JCE, did
nothing to prevent the recurrence of the expanded crimes, and continued with the
implementation of the original criminal purpose. If this situation occurs the
prosecution must identify when the expanded crimes became incorporated into the
common purpose of the original JCE.105

•

The indictment must set out the material facts of the prosecution’s case with
enough detail to give the defendant notice of the crimes he is being charged
with.106

¶419 (April 3, 2007) the Appeals Chamber held while must exist a plurality of persons belonging
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•

The Prosecution must show that the accused shares the mens rea of the other
members of the JCE in joining the JCE and perform acts that are directed at
furthering the common design.107

•

For crimes committed by non-members of the JCE, the prosecution must show
that the commission of the crime by non-members of the JCE formed part of a
common criminal purpose, or and organized criminal system, or were a natural
and foreseeable consequence of a common criminal purpose.108

42. CO-PERPETRATION

Co-perpetration is a mode of criminal responsibility identified under article 25(3)(a) of
the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC).109 This section of the Statute
identifies three distinct modes of perpetration: direct perpetration (direct commission of a crime),
co-perpetration (commission of a crime jointly with another person), and indirect perpetration
(commission of a crime through another person).110
Co-perpetration as embodied in article 25(3)(a) is to be understood under the pretext of
“joint control” over the crime resulting from an individuals “essential contribution” to the
crime.111 In essence this interpretation of co-perpetration under the Rome Statute differs from
the interpretation ascribed to “co-perpetration” at the international tribunals due to its conception
107
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of “joint control” over the crimes as opposed to the broader JCE concept of “common plan or
purpose”.112 As the pre-trial chamber in Prosecutor v. Lubanga stated “the concept of coperpetration is originally rooted in the idea that when the sum of the co-ordinated individual
contributions of a plurality of persons results in the realization of all the objective elements of a
crime, any person making a contribution can be held vicariously responsible for the commissions
of all the others, and as a result, can be considered as a principal to the whole crime”113
In differentiating between principals and accessories, co-perpetration as understood as
“control over the crime” holds not only those who physically carry out the objective elements of
an offence but also those who control or mastermind its commission liable because of their
control over whether and how the crime is committed.114 The Pre-Trial Chamber in Lubanga
thus held that the concept of co-perpetration as adopted by the Rome Statute involves an
objective element concerning actual exercise of control over a crime, and a subjective element
concerning the awareness of the individual of their control.115 As such in order to be considered
a principle under co-perpetration an individual must have both control over the crime and be
aware of having such control. The Pre-Trial Chamber reasoned that these individual may be
principals because:
•

They physically carry out the objective elements of the offence, they control the
will of those who carry out the objective elements of the offence; and
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•

They have, along with others, control over the offence by reason of the essential
tasks assigned to them.116

Thus co-perpetration as understood as joint control over a crime is based upon the
principle that the essential tasks of a crime are divided between multiple people acting in concert.
The concept of the shared control is based upon the fact that each individual could frustrate the
commission of the crime through a refusal to commit their task.117
This differs from the primarily subjective approach taken by the ad hoc tribunals to the
concept of joint criminal enterprise, which focuses its attention upon the intent of those
participating in the “common plan”. Furthermore the concept of JCE is included in the Rome
Statute in article 25(3)(d) but is considered primarily to be a concept of residual and indirect
accessory liability.118 Article 25(3)(d) is defined as:
•

A contribution to the commission or attempted commission of a crime by a group
of persons acting with a common purpose;

•

With the aim of furthering the criminal activity of the group or in the knowledge
of the criminal purpose.119

a. Elements of Co-perpetratorship
xix. Objective Elements (Actus Reus)
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The first objective element of co-perpetration is the existence of an agreement or
common plan between multiple people. As such participation by an individual not connected to
the common plan falls outside of co-perpetration.120 Furthermore the common plan must include
an element of criminality, although it need not be inherently criminal. The Pre-Trial Chamber in
Lubanga held that it suffices where:
•

The co-perpetrators agreed to a plan with a non-criminal goal, with the condition
to commit the crime if certain circumstances occur; or

•

That the co-perpetrators (a) are aware of the risk that implementing the common
plan (which is specifically directed at the achievement of a non-criminal goal)
will result in the commission of a crime and (b) accept such an outcome.121

The pretrial chamber also held that the agreement need not be explicit and can be inferred
from the subsequent actions of the co-conspirators.122
The second objective element of co-perpetration is that the co-ordinated essential
contribution made by each co-perpetrator resulted in the realization of the objective elements of
the crime that was committed.123 This element distinguishes participants between those who
exercise joint control over the crime, via their essential tasks and their ability to frustrate the
commission of the crime from, from those participants who cannot be said to have joint control
over the crime.
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xx. Subjective Elements (Mens Rea)
The first subjective element necessary for co-perpetration is that the individual fulfils all
of the subjective elements of the crime with which he or she is charged, including any specific or
requisite intent.124 Article 30 of the Rome Statute specifies that an individual shall be criminally
responsible only:
•

If the person is “aware that a circumstance exists or a consequence will occur in
the ordinary course of events”125; and

•

If the person means to engage in the relevant consequence or is aware that it will
occur in the ordinary course of events.126

The statute further specifically requires a volitional element from the accused individual.
This encompasses many situations including where the suspect knows his actions or omissions
will bring about the objective elements of the crime, and undertakes such actions or omissions
with the concrete intent to bring about the objective elements of the crime (dolus directus of the
first degree).127 It also encompasses situations where a suspect lacking specified intent to
commit the crime, is aware of that the elements of such crime will be the necessary outcome of
his action or omission (dolus directus of the second degree); and where a suspect is aware of the
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risk that the elements of the crime may result from his actions or omissions and accepts the risk
of such an outcome (dolus eventualis)128.
The Pre-Trial Chamber in Lubanga found two specific situations in which dolus
eventualis applies. The first situation is where the risk of the objective elements of the crime
being fulfilled is substantial (“will occur in the ordinary course of events”). In this case an
individuals acceptance of such a risk can be inferred from the individual’s awareness of the
substantial likelihood that his or her actions or omissions would result in the crime being
committed, and the individual’s decision to carry such action or omission anyways.129 The
second situation is where the risk of the commission of such crimes is low. In this case the
individual must have “clearly expressed or accepted” that such crimes may result from his or her
actions or omissions.130 Furthermore where an individual’s state of mind falls short of accepting
that the crime may occur as a result of his or her actions or omissions, such a person will fail to
meet the necessary “intent and knowledge” requirement of Article 30.131
The pretrial chamber in Lubanga further noted however that the “intent or knowledge”
requirement of article 30 is merely the default rule where a crime under the statute does not have
a specified mens rea requirement. Where the definition of the relevant crime under the statute
contains a different mens rea requirement, such mens rea is applied.132 Thus it is possible for a
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co-perpetrator to be charged with the commission of a crime that requires only recklessness or
negligence rather than purposefulness or knowledge so long as the accused acted or omitted with
the requisite intent.133
The second subjective element of co-perpetration based upon joint control over the crime
furthermore requires that the suspect and other co-perpetrators:
•

Must all be mutually aware of the risk that the implementation of their common
plan may result in the commission of the accused crime, and;

•

Must all mutually accept such risk.134

Where there is a substantial risk of the commission of the crime mutual acceptance by the
suspect and co-perpetrators can be inferred from:
•

The awareness by the suspect and co-perpetrators of the substantial likelihood that
implementing the common plan would result in the crime, and;

•

The fact that the suspect and co-perpetrators to implement the common plan
anyways.

Where however the risk of the crime being committed is low, the suspect and coperpetrators must have “clearly or expressly” accepted the risk that their common plan would
result in the commission of the crime.135
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Thus the Pre-Trial Chamber in Lubanga held that although some crimes listed under the
statute apply lesser volitional requirements such as recklessness to direct responsibility, it would
be fundamentally contrary to the nature of co-perpetration to apply the lesser standard to only
one individual of the co-perpetration. Instead all co-perpetrators must mutually share in the
awareness of the risk and accept it.136
The final subjective element of co-perpetration is that the suspect be aware of the
circumstance allowing him or her to jointly control the crime. This requires that the suspect be
aware:
• That his role is essential to the implementation of the common plan, and;
•

That because of his essential role he has the power to frustrate the implementation of the
common plan, and thus the commission of the crime, by refusing to complete his task.137
b. Pleading Requirements of article 61
The Pre-Trial Chamber of the ICC is responsible for overseeing and regulating the

pleading process encompassed in the confirmation hearing under article 61 of the Rome
Statute.138 The confirmation hearing is held to confirm the charges that the Prosecutor intends to
seek at trial. At the confirmation hearing the prosecution is required to support each charge with
sufficient evidence to establish “substantial grounds” to believe that the accused committed the
crimes charged.139 It is the Pre-Trial Chamber’s responsibility to determine whether the
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evidentiary standard of “substantial grounds” has been met. If the Pre-Trial Chamber finds that
the prosecution has met its evidentiary standard it will confirm those charges in relation to which
it has determined that there is sufficient evidence, and commit the person to a Trial Chamber for
trial on the charges as confirmed.140
Sections V and VI of Chapter Five of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the ICC
contain the procedural provisions regarding the confirmation of charges under article 61 of the
Rome Statue. Of primary importance is Rule 121 in section V concerning the document
containing the charges. Rule 121(3) states that: “The prosecutor shall provide to the Pre-Trial
Chamber and the person, no later than 30 days before the date of the confirmation hearing, a
detailed description of the charges together with a list of the evidence which he or she intends to
present at the hearing.”141
Furthermore, according to the regulation 52 of the Regulations of the Court the
Document Containing the Charges (DCC) must include:
•

The full name of the person and any other relevant identifying information

•

A statement of the facts, including the time and place of the alleged crimes, which
provides a sufficient legal and factual basis to bring the person or person to trial,
including relevant facts for the exercise of jurisdiction by the Court; and

•

A legal characterization of the facts to accord both with the crimes under articles 6, 7 or 8
and the precise form of participation under articles 25 and 28.142
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c. Evidentiary Standard of article 61
The Pre-Trial Chamber in Prosecutor v. Lubanga held that the purpose of the
confirmation hearing is to commit to trial “only those persons against whom sufficiently
compelling charges, going beyond mere theory or suspicion, have been brought”.143 Thus the
Pre-Trial Chamber paid particularly strict attention to interpreting what evidentiary standard
would qualify to meet the “substantial grounds” requirement of Article 61(7). In order to define
the concept of “substantial grounds” the Pre-Trial Chamber in Lubanga looked to international
human rights jurisprudence developed by the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR). The
Pre-Trial Chamber noted that the ECHR in Soering v. United Kingdom defined “substantial
grounds to believe” as “substantial grounds have been shown for believing” and further defined
“substantial grounds to believe” as “strong grounds for believing” in Mamatkulov and Askarov v.
Turkey.144
The Pre-Trial Chamber in Lubanga thus concluded that in order “for the Prosecution to
meet its evidentiary burden, it must offer concrete and tangible proof demonstrating a clear line
of reasoning underpinning its specific allegations.”145 The Pre-Trial Chamber further held that
the “substantial grounds to believe” standard “must enable all the evidence admitted for the
purpose of the confirmation hearing to be assessed as a whole.”146 The Lubanga Pre-Trial
Chamber concluded that only after scrutinizing all of the evidence, including preliminary witness
143
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statements, can it determine whether the Prosecution’s allegations are sufficiently strong to
commit the accused to trial. Thus in Lubanaga the Chamber examined the prosecution’s List of
Evidence and summarized witness statements in scrutinizing whether the prosecution had met its
evidentiary burden, eventually holding that it had.147
d. Cases at the International Criminal Court
With strict pleading requirements arising from the Rule 121(3) of the Rome Statute Rules
of Procedure, that the prosecution must provide “a detailed description of the charges together
with a list of the evidence which he or she intends to present at the hearing”, allegations of
improper pleading have arisen in all three Pre-Trial decisions that have been rendered so far.
e. Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo
.
In Prosecutor v. Lubanga the defense challenged the pleading based on (1) the factual
and legal vagueness of the charges, and (2) the articulation of irrelevant facts used to support the
charges sought. In the DCC the prosecution charged Thomas Lubanga Dyilo under articles
8(2)(e)(viii) and 25(3)(a) with war crimes of conscripting and enlisting children under the age of
fifteen years into an armed group (the FPLC, a part of the UPC) and using them actively in
hostilities in a conflict not of an international character.148 The prosecution in the DCC
submitted that the UPC actively recruited the children to military training in the training camp of
Sota149. The prosecution further submitted that Lubanga participated in the continued systemic
enlistment and use of child soldiers and identified multiple additional training camps for these
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child soldiers by location.150 The DCC finished by submitting that Lubanga was criminally
responsible for the crimes of recruitment and use of child under the age of fifteen years to
participate actively in hostilities as a “co-perpetrator, jointly with other FPLC officers and UPC
members and supporters”.151
In contesting the charges against Lubanga the defense claimed that:
“Thomas Lubanga Byilo has the right to be promptly informed of the nature and cause of the
charge. The nature of the charge refers to the precise legal qualification of the offence, and the
cause of the charge refers to the facts underlying it. In terms of the cause of the charge, the
Prosecution must plead all material facts which, to the extent possible, should include the identity
of the victims, the place and approximate date of the acts and the means by which the offences
were committed.”152

The Pre-Trial Chamber in Lubanga first held that in order for the prosecution to meet its
evidentiary burden it must present concrete and tangible evidence, which “demonstrate(s) a clear
line of reasoning underpinning its specific allegation”153. The Pre-Trial Chamber explained that
the purpose of the decision was for the chamber to “determine whether it is thoroughly satisfied
that the prosecution’s allegations are sufficiently strong to commit the suspect for trial.”154
As such the Pre-Trial Chamber dismissed the defense’s objections, holding that the DCC
met the criteria of regulation 52 and was a “detailed” description of the charges against Lubanga.
The Pre-Trial Chamber held that the DCC is to be read in conjunction with the Prosecution List
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of Evidence155 and when done so the Chamber found that there was sufficient evidence relating
to each paragraph and allegation in the DCC, that the prosecution met its burden.
In relation to defense’s claims of legal vagueness in the DCC the Pre-Trial Chamber in
Lubanga held that the prosecution was under no obligation to articulate its legal interpretation of
the modes of liability and crimes alleged. Rather the Pre-Trial Chamber held that the DCC was
proper and non-prejudicial to the defense so long as the defense was put on notice by a clear
articulation of the alleged crimes themselves and mode of liability.156
Finally the Pre-Trial Chamber in Lubanga also held that nothing prevents the prosecution
from including in its pleading the wording “any events which occurred before or during the
commission of the acts with which the suspect is charged, especially if that would be helpful in
better understanding the context in which the conduct charged occurred.”157 While the Pre-Trial
Chamber expressed its desire for the prosecution to plead with greater specificity the context in
which the crimes occurred158 and provide greater specificity in the Prosecution List of
Evidence159, it noted that all of the procedural requirements of pleading had been sufficiently met
and thus rejected the defense’s allegations of improper pleading.
f. Prosecutor v. Katanga and Chui
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In Prosecutor v. Katanga and Chui the Pre-Trial Chamber declined to confirm the war
crime charges in the indictment of inhuman treatment where the prosecution proffered no
evidence showing that the commission of such crimes was intended by the suspects as part o
their common plan to “wipe out” Bogoro village.160 The Pre-Trial Chamber further held that the
prosecution had not provided sufficient evidence to establish grounds to believe that, as a result
of the implementation of the common plan, these crimes would have occurred in the ordinary
course of events.161
The Pre-Trial Chamber further considered how to deal with alternative pleadings in the
indictment of criminal responsibility under Article 25. In Katanga and Chui the prosecution
charged Katanga and Chui as co-perpetrators of a common plan to commit war crimes and
crimes against humanity in the village of Bogoro pursuant to Article 25(3)(a)162 and alternatively
with ordering the commission of war crimes and crimes against humanity under Article 25(3)(b)
as accessories for ordering their subordinates to attack the civilian population with the requisite
intent.163 The Pre-Trial Chamber held that the prosecution is properly allowed to plead
alternative modes of individual criminal responsibility and further found that where there is
sufficient evidence to establish a higher and more direct modes of criminality of co-perpetration
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listed as Article 25(3)(a), such findings render moot the consideration of lesser forms of criminal
responsibility identified under Article 25(3)(b) to (d).164
In Judge Anita Usacka’s dissenting opinion in Katanga and Chui she noted that during
the confirmation phase the prosecution’s evidentiary burden is lowered, as witness by the
allowance of summaries of witness statements and unattested documentary evidence. In her
opinion the prosecution’s burden is “only to provide enough evidence to establish grounds to
believe that the crimes were committed by the suspect, rather than evidence to prove the
accused’s culpability beyond a reasonable doubt.165
g. Prosecutor v. Bemba
In Prosecutor v. Bemba the prosecution charged Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo with crimes
against humanity and war crimes as a “co-perpetrator” under Article 25(3)(a) of the Rome Statue
in relation to crimes committed by his forces from 2002-2003 against the civilian population of
the Central African Republic.166 At the original confirmation hearing the Pre-Trial Chamber
chose to adjourn the hearing because it considered the evidence submitted to establish a different
mode of criminality under the jurisdiction of the court. The Chamber requested the Prosecution
to consider submitting an Amended DCC addressing Bemba’s criminal liability under Article 28
of the Statute. Thus in the Amended DCC the Prosecution charged Bemba as a “co-perpetrator”
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under Article 25(3)(a) or alternatively as a “military commander or superior” under Article 28(a)
or (b).167
In Bemba the Pre-Trial Chamber II had to address multiple objections raised by the
Defense in regards to the Prosecutions pleadings of the crimes in the Amended DCC. In Bemba
the Defense first challenged the characterization of the charges as being overly vague. In
particular the Defense challenged the use of the expression “include, but (…) not limited to” in
listing the particular criminal incidents the suspect was charged in being involved with as being
overly vague and failing to give the accused notice of the criminal incidents he was accused
perpetrating.168 However the Pre-Trial Chamber held that article 61(5) of the Statute requires
only that the Prosecutor provide “sufficient” evidence to allow the Chamber to determine
whether there were substantial grounds to believe the suspect committed the crimes charged.
Thus the Pre-Trial Chamber held that the prosecutor need not identify all specific criminal
incidents so long as enough are identified to put the suspect on notice and to meet the evidentiary
standard.169
The Defense in Bemba further objected to what it considered vaguity in the Prosecutions
use of the terms “from on or about 26 October 2002 to march 2003” in the Amended Document
Containing the Charges. The Defense claimed that the terms used were imprecise and confusing
and that the Prosecution was required to provide precise dates for each specific criminal incident
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alleged.170 However, while the Chamber agreed that each incident should be identified and dated
as precisely as possible as required by regulation 52 of the Regulations, the Chamber found that
the Prosecution had provided the requisite information under each count alleged in the DCC and
thus provided the accused proper notice of the incidents he was accused perpetrating, rendering
the Defenses objection moot.171
The Defense’s final objection to the pleadings alleged that the Prosecutor in the Amended
DCC had reopened the defendant’s individual criminal responsibility under article 25(3)(a)
contrary to the Chamber’s Adjournment Decision. In the Chamber’s Adjournment Decision the
Chamber had requested the Prosecutor to elaborate on the potential use of Article 28 in
addressing the defendant’s individual criminal responsibility. The Defense thus requested the
rejection of the sections of the Amended DCC relating to the charges brought under article
25(3)(a).172 However after examining the Amended DCC in comparison with the initial DCC the
Chamber found that there were no substantive changes to the charges sought under article
25(3)(a) and thus there was no basis for the Defenses objections.173

43. Conclusion
All pleading requirements must be read in light of the universally accepted right of the
accused to be provided notice of the crimes he is accused of having committed. Thus pleading in
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both JCE and co-perpetration is guided by the fact the fact that both are modes of criminality and
not crimes themselves. Thus regardless of charging JCE or co-perpetration, the prosecution must
plead enough material facts to establish the objective and subjective elements of the crime
committed as well as sufficient facts to establish the objective and subjective elements of
accused’s mode of criminal responsibility.
a. JCE Requirements
JCE pleading requirements are guided by provisions of the Statutes of the international
tribunals such as Article 18(4) of the ICTY Statute and Article 17(4) of the ICTR. Furthermore,
ever since the Appeals Judgment in Tadic there has developed substantial precedent concerning
both the scope of JCE and its pleading requirements.
This precedent shows that JCE is a proper form of individual criminal responsibility, but
that because it is such a broad form of responsibility it must be subject to elevated levels of
pleading in comparison with other modes of liability. Thus the cases at the international
tribunals show that the prosecution must define what the common design, purpose, or plan of the
JCE is and identify which form of JCE liability it seeks. Precedent from the international
tribunals further sets out that the prosecution must identify the principal perpetrators of the crime
and the co-perpetrators of the JCE. It further shows that if the objective of the JCE changes such
that it is different in nature from the original plan then the prosecution must plead that a new JCE
has been established and identify the nature and participants of the JCE. Alternatively it shows
that the criminal purpose of a JCE may change if the leading members of the JCE were informed
of subsequent crimes not encompassed in the original JCE and nevertheless continued with the
implementation of the original criminal purpose.
b. Co-perpetration Requirements
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In order for the prosecution to meet its evidentiary burden it must present concrete and
tangible evidence, which “demonstrate(s) a clear line of reasoning underpinning its specific
allegation” because the confirmation hearing is held in order for the chamber to “determine
whether it is thoroughly satisfied that the prosecution’s allegations are sufficiently strong to
commit the suspect for trial.” The DCC is to be read in conjunction with the Prosecution List of
Evidence in order to evaluate whether that the prosecution met its burden. The prosecution was
under no obligation to articulate its legal interpretation of the modes of liability and crimes
alleged. The prosecution plead that the crimes charged, were intended by the suspects as part o
their common plan. The prosecution is also allowed to plead alternative modes of individual
criminal responsibility.
The Rome Statute requires only that the prosecutor provide “sufficient” evidence in the
indictment to allow the Chamber to determine whether there were substantial grounds to believe
the suspect committed the crimes charged.
c. Comparing JCE and Co-perpetration
Co-perpetration is a substantively different mode of criminal responsibility than JCE,
which has thus far avoided many of the pleading issues that have plagued JCE indictments.
Unlike JCE, which was inferred into the statutes of the international tribunals through
international common law, co-perpetration is a statutorily defined mode of criminality. As such,
where the scope and pleading rules of JCE had to be defined in the chambers of the international
tribunals, the scope and pleading rules of co-perpetration are much more narrowly defined in the
Rome Statute. While ambiguities still exist, the Statute and Rules of the ICC were drafted in
much more precise manners so as to more narrowly define elements of crimes, evidentiary
standards, and rules of procedure. Furthermore, the Pre-Trial Chamber has endeavored to outline
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a clear and consistent legal interpretation of co-perpetration under article 25(3)(a) so as to avoid
many of the problems JCE has encountered.
With the elevated requirements of pleading at the ICC the procedural arguments alleged
by the defenses at the international tribunals have not arisen to the same degree. The ICC
Document(s) Containing the Charges are exceptionally detailed and while there have been
challenges as to the legal interpretations of co-perpetration, there have not been many as to the
form of the indictments. Thus it should be considered that while indictments need not outlines
the entirety of the prosecution’s case, the prosecution should endeavor to outline with the utmost
specificity the elements of the crimes the defendant is alleged to have committed and the
elements of the mode of liability by which the defendant is alleged to have committed the
crimes.
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